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Abstract
This study investigates the role personal connections play in a crucial element of the
supply chain—supplier selection. We find that the likelihood that a potential supplier
(hereafter, a vendor) is selected to be an actual supplier (hereafter, supplier) increases
when personal connections between executives of the vendor and the customer exist.
The magnitude of the effect varies predictably across management ranks and positions
and is stronger when information asymmetries between a vendor and a customer are
high. Conditioning on the existence of a supply-chain partnership, a departure of a
personally connected executive prompts the termination of the supply-chain relation-
ship more often than a departure of an unconnected executive. Additional analyses
show personal connections are associated with less restrictive procurement contracts
and with improved customer performance after the formation of a supply-chain rela-
tionship. Overall, our study highlights the role of personal connections in reducing
information asymmetry and improving operating efficiency in the supply chain.
Keywords Personal connections . Supplier selection . Supply chain . Information
asymmetry
JEL G32 . G34 . L1 .M11
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1 Introduction
This study investigates the effect of personal connections on a key corporate decision—
supplier selection. Selecting suppliers, a critical element of a firm’s supply-chain
management and ultimately of its success, has become more complex in recent years,
as more firms outsource larger parts of their supply chain (Yang 2009; McCarthy et al.
2013; Boyarchenko and Costello 2015). Consistent with a complex supplier-selection
process, the literature on supplier selection specifies qualitative measures, such as
suppliers’ reputation and management quality as prominent in evaluating vendors when
selecting suppliers. (See the literature review on supplier-selection criteria by Ho et al.
2010.) The rise of outsourcing in the supply chain and the need to rely on qualitative
supplier-selection measures accentuate the information-asymmetry problem in supplier
selection (McCarthy et al. 2013).
Because research suggests personal connections can mitigate information
asymmetries in investing and financing decisions (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Duchin
and Sosyura 2013; Engelberg et al. 2012; Fracassi 2017; Gao et al. 2014), we focus on
the role personal connections play in supplier selection. McCarthy et al. (2013) note
that low information asymmetries between supply-chain partners are achieved when
“both parties are more inclined to trust each other, communicate more openly, and
coordinate and collaborate for mutual benefits” (p. 278). If personal connections can
foster trust and open communication, to mitigate information asymmetry between
potential trading partners, their presence is likely to increase the likelihood of the
formation of supply chain-relations, that is, to increase the likelihood of a vendor being
selected as a supplier.
We identify personal connections using BoardEx, a proprietary database that reports
the universities that executives attended, their employment histories, affiliations with
charitable or volunteer organizations, and board of directors on which they have served.
In establishing a causal relation between personal connections and a supply-chain
relationship, we are mindful of a potential reverse causality, in which business rela-
tionships may lead to personal connections. Therefore, we follow Engelberg et al.
(2012) and focus on personal connections that preceded the business relations by years
or even decades. That is, we focus on connections formed when executives were
enrolled in the same degree program at the same university and connections formed
when executives worked together at the same firm before their current jobs at the
supply-chain partners.
To analyze the economic effect of these connections on supplier selection, we begin
with Compustat Segment file, which contains information on major customers’ iden-
tities, and compile the first-time actual supplier-customer pairs. We focus on first-time
supply-chain relations for two reasons. First, repeated business may foster the forma-
tion of personal connections, creating reverse-causality concerns. First-time relations
are less prone to this issue. Second, focusing on first-time relations can mitigate serial-
correlation concerns in the empirical analysis. For every first-time supplier-customer
pair, we then seek to identify vendors that the same customer considers alternatives to
the chosen supplier. Ideally, we should include the actual vendors a customer considers
in the vetting process. However, given that this information is unobservable, deciding
which vendors to include becomes challenging and subjective. For the main empirical
analyses, following Erel et al. (2019), we rely on revealed preferences and use the
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Mahalanobis distance method to identify two vendors closest in relevant, observable
attributes (i.e., four-digit SIC code, firm size, sales, and profitability) to the selected
supplier. Recognizing the subjectivity of our choice, we also conduct batches of
robustness tests by altering the attributes we match on and the number of vendors to
match with the selected supplier. Our results are robust to these choices.
We first show that the likelihood of a vendor becoming a supplier increases if the
customer and vendor executives are personally connected. This result holds for per-
sonal connections formed through both education and prior employment. The existence
of personal connections increases the likelihood of a vendor being selected as a supplier
by 60% of the baseline probability. As discussed earlier, we address the reverse-
causality issue by focusing on education-based and prior work-based personal connec-
tions. However, because supplier selection may involve multiple unobservable factors,
endogeneity may still be a concern. We employ multiple strategies to alleviate this
concern. First, we test whether the effect of personal connections varies predictably
across different ranks and positions of executives. We find that connections between
top-level executives (C-Level) exhibit statistically stronger effects than those between
lower-level executives. In addition, connections involving a customer’s COO—who
oversees the supply chain in most firms—have a more pronounced effect on supplier
selection than connections involving a CEO or CFO. Second, we employ an exogenous
shock to personal connection—a departure of a connected executive—and test whether
this shock prompts the termination of the business relations. The idea is that the loss of
personal connections may weaken the trust and open communication between trading
partners, resulting in an increase of information asymmetry and thus an earlier termi-
nation of the business relations. We find that customer-supplier relations end earlier
after a departure of a connected executive than after a departure of an unconnected one.
Finally, we conduct multiple sensitivity analyses to further address endogeneity and
reverse causality, which we describe and tabulate in the online appendix.
Although we have conducted batches of sensitivity tests discussed above, we
acknowledge that no test can rule out endogeneity in empirical studies such as ours
and that empirical choices we made, in particular with respect to the selection of
nonsupplier vendors, may have led to our results. Thus our results should be read with
caution, subject to the remaining concern that we have not considered all possible
endogenous factors.
After providing robust evidence that personal connections affect the formation of
supply-chain relations, we conduct cross-sectional tests to illuminate how personal
connections affect supplier selection. If personal connections improve the customer’s
knowledge about her connected vendor and thus reduce information asymmetry, we
predict that the relation between personal connections and the likelihood of a vendor
becoming a supplier will be stronger when ex ante information symmetry is higher.
Using two proxies for information asymmetry—the geographical distance between
customers and vendors and vendors’ accounting quality (measured by unsigned abnor-
mal accruals)—we find evidence consistent with this prediction. These results suggest
personal connections facilitate soft-information transmission between supply-chain
partners, thereby expanding firms’ geographical boundaries and mitigating frictions
arising from firms’ poor-quality hard information.
Whereas our study focuses on the effect of personal connections on supplier
selection, we also explore two dimensions of their consequences. First, we examine
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the effect of personal connections on provisions in procurement contracts. Costello
(2013) suggests provisions in procurement contracts are designed to mitigate informa-
tion asymmetries between the customer and supplier. Using a hand-collected sample of
procurement contracts, we find that procurement contracts between personally con-
nected supply-chain partners are likely to be less restrictive to the supplier and to have
longer contract duration. This evidence suggests informal personal relationships be-
tween executives may substitute formal contracting, which again is consistent with the
role of personal connections in mitigating information frictions. Second, we investigate
the effect of personal connections on customer operating efficiency. We identify four
aspects of operating efficiency that are likely to be affected by the quality of supplier
selection: inventory-supply interruptions (measured by the volatility of inventory
levels), inventory overstocking (measured by the volatility of the cost of goods sold),
sales efficiency (measured as the ratio of sales to assets), and overall operating
performance (measured by ROA). We find all four measures improve after the forma-
tion of a supply-chain relationship involving a personally connected supplier.
Our study contributes to the literature in three important ways. First, our findings
highlight the importance of personal connections in a critical firm operating deci-
sion. Our results show personal connections increase a vendor’s chance of being
selected as a supplier. Second, our findings highlight the role of personal connec-
tions in transmitting soft information and expanding geographical constraints along
supply chains, complementing research documenting their importance to mutual
fund managers’ investment decisions (Cohen et al. 2008) and firms’ external
financing decisions (Engelberg et al. 2012). Last, we show personal connections
relax procurement-contract terms and improve firms’ operating efficiency. These
findings not only corroborate the evidence that personal connections can alleviate
informational frictions but also offer additional insights into the contracting litera-
ture and, perhaps more importantly, highlight the real value that personal connec-
tions create.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature
and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 discusses sample selection. Section 4
presents empirical results and additional analyses. Section 5 concludes.
2 Hypothesis development
Customer-supplier relationships are widely recognized as an important part of supply-
chain management. Sarkis and Talluri (2002) argue: “One of the critical challenges
faced by purchasing managers is the selection of strategic partners that will furnish their
firms with the necessary products, components, and materials in a timely and effective
manner to help maintain a competitive advantage” (p. 18). Research documents that the
influence of customer-supplier relationships transcends the provision of products and
services, affecting firm capital structure (Kale and Shahrur 2007), liquidity manage-
ment (Cohen and Li 2014; Cohen and Li 2017; Costello 2017), and financial-reporting
policy (Hui et al. 2012).
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Supply-chain risks can stem from multiple sources, such as an increase in the price
of supplier inputs or of financing costs,1 a supplier setback such as a plant fire, a
supplier re-allocation of its product capacity because of a change in demand to its
products,2 or a supplier’s bankruptcy.3 Operations research suggests a few ways—
operational or contractual—to mitigate these risks (Yang 2009; Anupindi and Akella
1993; Tomlin 2006; Babich et al. 2005; Babich et al. 2007; Serel et al. 2001; Kouvelis
and Milner 2002; Babich 2006). However, the mechanisms these studies suggest are
either too costly to implement or cannot effectively shield a customer from all the risks
involved. Thus these risks must be evaluated when selecting a supplier.
In recent years, more firms have moved toward integrated supply chains, in which
larger parts of the supply chain are outsourced (Yang 2009; McCarthy et al. 2013;
Boyarchenko and Costello 2015). The move has accentuated supply-chain risks and
increased the complexity of the supplier-selection process, which leads customers to
employ softer measures to evaluate vendors. Research argues these measures better
mitigate supply-chain risks than focusing only on price (e.g., Ittner et al. 1999). The
literature on supplier selection reports multiple soft vendor evaluation criteria that are
prominent among customers selecting suppliers. Factors such as product quality,
reputation, and position in industry (e.g., Liu et al. 2000; Weber et al. 2000; Bevilacqua
et al. 2006; Chou and Chang 2008; Demirtas and Üstün 2009), and delivery reliability/
on-time delivery (e.g., Liu et al. 2000; Weber et al. 2000; Çebi and Bayraktar 2003;
Perçin 2006; Demirtas and Üstün 2009) are ranked first and second among the
evaluating criteria covered in the supplier-selection literature, whereas price/cost ranks
only third. (See a review of the literature by Ho et al. 2010.) Other qualitative factors
that the supplier-selection literature views as important are manufacturing capability
(e.g., Liu et al. 2000; Sevkli et al. 2007; Demirtas and Üstün 2009) and management
(e.g., Chen and Huang 2007; Sevkli et al. 2007). These evaluation measures employed
in supplier selection accentuate the importance of soft information and informal
channels of acquiring information by customers.
Consistent with research that shows personal connections improve the transmission
of soft (private) information between firms and fund managers (Cohen et al. 2008),
lenders and borrowers (Engelberg et al. 2012), headquarters and division managers
(Duchin and Sosyura 2013), and board members (Fracassi 2017), we argue personal
connections may also be influential in the supplier-selection process. Because cus-
tomers’ executives with personal connections may already have extensive knowledge
of the connected vendor’s operations through informal interactions, this knowledge
likely mitigates information asymmetry between them and helps a customer more
accurately assess supply-chain risks. In addition, after the formation of a supply-
chain relationship, personal connections can not only reduce the costs and improve
the effectiveness of monitoring the supplier but also allow the customer to receive
1 For example, Collins & Aikman, a large supplier of carpeting, instrument panels, and other parts to Ford
Motors, halted shipment in 2006 over a dispute about a price increase that was part of the supplier’s effort to
stave off bankruptcy after filing for Chapter 11 protection in 2005 (McCracken 2006).
2 For example, Beckman Coulter, a medical device manufacturer, lost its supplier, Dovatron, after Flextronics
acquired Dovatron in 2000. After the acquisition, Flextronics restructured Dovatron to focus on higher-volume
products and decided it would no longer serve Beckman Coulter (Yang 2009).
3 Yang (2009) provides the example of the bankruptcy of UPF-Thompson, the sole provider of chassis for
Land Rover’s Discovery model.
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timely updates of suppliers’ shocks, which in turn enables her to take timely actions to
minimize her exposure to supply-chain risks. Due to these benefits, we hypothesize the
following.
The likelihood that a vendor becomes a supplier increases if personal connec-
tions exist between the vendor’s and the customer’s executives.
3 Sample selection, identification, and descriptive statistics
3.1 Sample selection
To construct the sample for the supplier-selection analysis (the main analysis), we start
with the Compustat Industry Segment file and identify first-time customer-supplier
relations among U.S. public firms with available data from year 2000 through 2011.
The file contains information about sales to major customers. Suppliers report this in
footnotes under SFAS 14 and SFAS 131. The threshold for mandatory reporting is that
a customer accounts for at least 10% of the reporting firm’s total sales. However, the
file also contains voluntary disclosures of major customers that account for less than
10% of sales. Because suppliers that choose to report customers that represent less than
10% of their sales may not be random, we exclude them from the sample. We also
exclude suppliers that do not disclose the identity of their major customers.4 We then
merge the sample with the BoardEx database.5 BoardEx reports work histories,
educations, and participation in social organizations for C-level (e.g., CEO and CFO)
executives, lower-level executives, and current directors. It is widely used in academic
studies that examine the effect of personal connections on business decisions (e.g.,
Engelberg et al. 2012; Schmidt 2015; Fracassi and Tate 2012). We focus on the period
starting from year 2000, because, before 2000, BoardEx’s coverage of U.S. public
firms is very limited (Engelberg et al. 2012; Fracassi and Tate 2012). We then expand
the sample by including vendors that the customer likely considered but did not select
as a supplier (nonsupplier vendors).
One drawback of using segment data to identify the start of customer-supplier
relations is that the dataset includes only large customers (i.e., those exceeding 10%
of the supplier’s sales). Thus the start date of the relationship may have been earlier
than when it was first disclosed in the filings, which could mean that a personal
connection that we identify as preceding the supply-chain relationship may have been
formed after the business relations started. To mitigate concerns about this reverse
causality, we follow Engelberg et al. (2012) by focusing on two types of personal
connections that likely precede business relations: educational connections and prior
work-based connections. Similar to Cohen et al. (2008), we classify two executives as
having an educational connection if they attended the same university, overlapped at
4 Ellis et al. (2012) suggest more than 20% of firms that report the existence of a major customer do not
disclose its identity.
5 We thank Joseph Engelberg for providing us with the CRSP-Compustat-BoardEx link file.
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least one year, and received the same degree.6 Consistent with Engelberg et al. (2012),
we classify two executives as having a work-based connection if they worked for the
same employer before the employment at the current customer and vendor. We also
require personal connections to predate the reported start date of the business relations
by at least two years. To verify that our choices are appropriate, we randomly select 50
observations and search the web and the Factiva database for the first mention of the
customer-supplier relations. In all 50 cases, the personal connection precedes the first
mention of the business relations. We then obtained financial data from Compustat and
stock return data from CRSP.
3.2 Identification of nonsupplier vendors
To test the effect of personal connections on supplier selection, we need to identify
potential suppliers that were not selected as suppliers (nonsupplier vendors). To draw
proper inferences, the nonsupplier vendors we identify must be comparable to the
supplier and thus be realistic candidates for the customer to consider. Identifying
suppliers is very costly for customers and involves reference checks of financial status
checks, the ability to meet specifications, product or service quality, and so on (Beil
2010). The more vendors the customer considers, the higher the cost of search. Thus
customers typically consider a small set of vendors when selecting a supplier. Ideally,
we could include the full set of vendors that the customer actually considered.
However, given that this information is unobservable, we attempt to identify, based
on revealed preference, vendors that were likely considered but were not selected. This
approach resembles that of Erel et al. (2019). To find a group of directors that are
comparable to the nominated directors, Erel et al. (2019) construct a candidate pool
comprising directors who, within one year of the appointment, joined the board of a
smaller neighboring firm of the focal firm. Similarly, we select nonsupplier vendors
within the four-digit SIC code of the supplier that most resemble the selected vendor
(i.e., the supplier). The assumption is that the potential supplier candidates the customer
considers resemble the actual supplier, based on her revealed preferences. To be
considered a nonsupplier vendor in our sample, a firm must satisfy an additional
preliminary requirement: it must have data available on BoardEx. We then use the
Mahalanobis distance approach to identify up to two nonsupplier vendors from the
same four-digit SIC industry and the same fiscal year that are closest to the supplier
with respect to size (total assets), performance (ROA), and sales.
We acknowledge that the focus on the above three factors is somewhat exploratory
and lacks theoretical support and that customers may consider additional factors when
winnowing the list of potential suppliers. However, as reported in Table 1, matching
based on the three factors yields a list of vendors that are also comparable to the actual
supplier across multiple other factors. Therefore these three factors seem to do a good
job of parsimoniously encompassing firms’ underlying fundamentals, which the cus-
tomer likely considers when selecting a supplier.
Because some industries defined as four-digit SICs have fewer than three firms,we identify
suitable nonsupplier vendors for 1430 suppliers, for a total of 2630 nonsupplier vendors. The
6 Following Cohen et al. (2008), we group all degrees into six categories: (1) business school (MBA), (2)
medical school, (3) general graduate (MA or MS), (4) PhD, (5) law school, and (6) general undergraduate.
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number of suppliers and nonsupplier vendors implies a baseline average probability of ~35%
that a vendor will be selected as a supplier. Table 1 reports statistics on major firm
fundamentals for the sample partitioned based onwhether a vendor is a supplier.We compare
suppliers with nonsupplier vendors across a comprehensive set of firm fundamentals that may







Mean STD Median Mean STD Median
TANGIBILITY_S 0.221 0.232 0.133 0.219 0.236 0.129 0.002
CASH_S 0.302 0.265 0.228 0.303 0.263 0.242 −0.001
SIZE_S 5.601 1.580 5.524 5.581 1.681 5.496 0.021
ROA_S 0.009 0.048 0.020 0.007 0.054 0.019 0.002
LEV_S 0.186 0.237 0.109 0.191 0.256 0.108 −0.005
LOG_SALE_S 5.137 1.775 5.209 5.151 1.796 5.137 −0.014
IVY_LEAGUE_S 0.163 0.262 0.000 0.162 0.262 0.000 0.001
PHD_MASTERS_S 0.509 0.365 0.500 0.497 0.348 0.500 0.011
LARGEST_S 0.049 0.217 0.000 0.050 0.219 0.000 −0.001
SALE_GROWTH_S 0.230 0.792 0.083 0.261 0.839 0.098 −0.031
GM_S 0.345 0.438 0.408 0.379 0.395 0.412 −0.034**
PM_S −0.136 0.375 0.013 −0.149 0.382 0.007 0.013
CAPEX_S 0.051 0.068 0.028 0.053 0.071 0.028 −0.003
DAYS_INV_S 67.667 79.840 45.158 71.586 81.536 51.298 −3.918
DAYS_AP_S 75.992 119.344 44.257 82.875 117.032 47.839 −6.883*
DAYS_AR_S 63.690 41.914 57.621 63.069 41.083 56.327 0.622
PPE_TO_S 12.065 19.771 5.636 13.154 22.774 5.896 −1.089
IHLD_S 0.083 0.102 0.044 0.085 0.100 0.052 −0.002
NEGFCF_S 0.434 0.496 0.000 0.461 0.499 0.000 −0.027*
RND_S 0.090 0.124 0.042 0.097 0.135 0.052 −0.007*
AGE_S 2.533 0.749 2.485 2.431 0.769 2.398 0.101***
AGE_C 3.423 0.640 3.638 3.432 0.636 3.638 −0.009
SIZE_C 10.253 1.218 10.370 10.257 1.226 10.368 −0.005
DISTANCE (miles) 1151.466 930.485 927.174 1091.372 974.382 848.855 60.094*
DISTANCE (LN) 6.439 1.522 6.833 6.260 1.690 6.745 0.179***
ABN_ACCRUAL_S 0.138 0.186 0.089 0.142 0.164 0.096 −0.004
This table reports descriptive statistics of major firm fundamentals for the supplier-selection sample (N =
4060). For each customer-supplier pair, we include up to two customer-nonsupplier vendor pairs. Customer-
nonsupplier pairs include the customer of the customer-supplier pair and one of the two closest nonsupplier
vendors to the supplier, within the same four-digit SIC code and fiscal year, with respect to total assets, ROA,
and sales. We use the Mahalanobis distance procedure to identify the two closest nonsupplier vendors. The
sample is partitioned based on whether the vendor is a supplier. In total, we have 1430 actual customer-
supplier pairs and 2630 customer-nonsupplier pairs. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix Table 10.
***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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affect supplier selection. Statistics show that, except for a few variables (e.g., supplier gross
margin and age), nonsupplier vendors and suppliers are similar in most fundamental charac-
teristics, suggesting the three variables employed in the Mahalanobis distance approach do a
good job matching the nonsupplier vendors with suppliers. To further alleviate the concern
that these firm characteristics might drive our results, we include all of them as control
variables in regression analyses.
Note that, relative to the supplier firms, matched nonsupplier vendors are slightly
farther away from the customer firm. If a firm chooses her suppliers based on distance
and distance happens to be correlated with personal connections, distance might
constitute a correlated omitted variable. To address this possibility, we include distance
as a control variable in all regression analyses. We further construct an alternative
sample by matching nonsupplier vendors with suppliers based on their distance from
the customer firm. This alternative matching procedure eliminates the difference in the
distance between supplier-customer pairs and nonsupplier-customer pairs. Our results
reported in online appendix, Table A4, are robust to this alternative sample.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports summary statistics of personal connections for our baseline supplier-
selection sample (N = 4060) consisting of both customer-supplier pairs and customer-
nonsupplier vendor pairs. Panels A and B focus on the source of connections and the
role of the connected executives in a firm, respectively. Panel A shows that 7.4% of our
sample have educational connections, 16.3% have past-work connections, and 21%
have either educational connections or past-work connections. Connections through
current employment or board memberships exist for 3.3% of the sample. These
statistics suggest the connections on which we focus are common in the product
market. Conditioning on the existence of at least one educational connection between
a pair of firms, the average number of educational connections is 1.24, and that of past-
work connections is not surprisingly higher, 2.86. Interestingly, the corresponding
number for current work connections and board memberships is 43, which is much
higher than the other two types of connections. This observation suggests these
connections may have resulted from the supply-chain relations and thus may pose a
reverse-causality concern. To mitigate this concern, we focus on educational and past-
work connections hereafter and exclude connections through current work and board
memberships. We also exclude connections through charities and other volunteer
groups, due to the same concerns about reverse causality. Panel B shows that 0.5%
of the sample observations have connections between CEOs, 1.9% have connections
between C-level executives at both firms, and 15.2% have connections between non-C
level executives at both firms. Customers’ CEOs (CFOs) are connected with vendor
executives at all rank levels for 2.2% (1.2%) of the sample, and customers’ COOs are
connected in 0.7% of the sample.
Table 3 reports summary statistics of personal connections for the sample partitioned
based on whether the vendor is also a supplier. Though the average number of
executives per firm reported on BoardEx is comparable between suppliers and
nonsupplier vendors, the percentage of suppliers that are personally connected is
greater than the percentage of nonsupplier vendors (educational connections: 10%
versus 6%; past-work connections: 23% versus 12.7%). We find similar results when
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics— Type of Personal Connections








Current Work and Board
Memberships
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Connection (1/0) 0.074 0.262 0.163 0.369 0.210 0.407 0.033 0.177
Number of Connections 0.092 0.352 0.456 2.654 0.559 2.767 1.400 11.816
Number of Connections
if Connection=1
1.243 0.494 2.864 6.144 2.667 5.563 43.068 50.177
Panel B: Management-Level Connections
1 2 3 4
CEO-CEO C Level Non-C Level CUST_CEO
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Connection (1/0) 0.005 0.071 0.019 0.136 0.152 0.359 0.022 0.144
Number of Connections 0.005 0.075 0.023 0.185 0.370 2.343 0.028 0.268
Number of Connections
if Connection=1
1.048 0.218 1.240 0.560 2.443 5.585 1.314 1.311
5 6
CUST_CFO CUST_COO
Mean STD Mean STD
Connection (1/0) 0.012 0.110 0.007 0.084
Number of Connections 0.016 0.191 0.011 0.148
Number of Connections
if Connection=1
1.294 1.171 1.567 0.817
Panel A of this table reports summary statistics on the types of personal connections reported in BoardEx for
all customer-supplier pairs and customer-nonsupplier vendor pairs in the supplier-selection sample (N = 4060).
Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation for educational connections (CON_EDU), which require
that the two executives attended the same school, overlapped for at least one year, and received the same
degree (e.g., MBA). Column 2 reports statistics for connections through past work (CON_WORK), which
requires that the two executives overlapped at the same firm for at least one year before their tenures at the
customer and vendor. Column 3 reports statistics for a connection variable that combines both educational and
past-work connections (CONNECTED). The connections defined in columns 1, 2, and 3 are the variables of
interest throughout the empirical tests. Column 4 reports statistics for the work connections that were
established while one of the executives worked for either the vendor or the customer and the connections
that were established while serving on the same corporate board(s). The connections in column 4 are excluded
from the analysis due to reverse-causality concerns.
Panel B of this table reports summary statistics on the management level of personal connections reported in
BoardEx for all customer-supplier pairs and customer-nonsupplier vendor pairs (N = 4060). The connections
correspond to the connections analyzed in Table 5. Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation for
personal connections between CEOs at the customer and vendor pairs. Column 2 reports statistics for
connections between two C-Level (e.g., CEO, CFO, and COO) officers at the customer-vendor pairs. Column
3 reports statistics for connections between non-C-Level officers. Column 4 reports statistics for connections
between customers’ CEOs and vendor executives at all rank levels. Column 5 reports statistics for connections
between customers’ CFOs and vendor executives at all rank levels. Column 6 reports statistics for connections
between customers’ COOs and vendor executives at all rank levels.
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we consider the number of connections between a pair of firms. This preliminary
evidence suggests personal connections may affect supplier selection.
4 Empirical analyses
4.1 The effect of personal connections on customers’ choice of suppliers
To test our hypothesis of the effect of personal connections on the selection of
suppliers, we estimate the model specified as follows.
SUPPLIERi; j;t ¼ β0 þ β1*CONNECTEDi; j;t þ β2*DISTANCEi; j;t
þ βl*VEND CONTROLSl; j;t þ βm*CUST CONTROLSm;i;t
þ γi*CUSTOMER−YEAR FEi þ εi; j;t
ð1Þ







Mean STD MED N Mean STD MED N
Number of executives
in BoardEx
10.735 7.778 9.000 2630 10.784 8.218 9.000 1430 −0.049
CON_EDU
Connection (1/0) 0.060 0.238 0.000 2630 0.100 0.300 0.000 1430 −0.040***
Number of Connections 0.075 0.318 0.000 2630 0.124 0.406 0.000 1430 −0.050***
Number of Connections
if Connection=1
1.250 0.502 1.000 158 1.247 0.506 1.000 143 −0.004
CON_WORK
Connection (1/0) 0.127 0.333 0.000 2630 0.230 0.421 0.000 1430 −0.103***
Number of Connections 0.323 1.347 0.000 2630 0.731 4.147 0.000 1430 −0.408***
Number of Connections
if Connection=1
2.534 2.931 1.000 333 3.124 8.077 2.000 329 −0.627
CONNECTED
Connection (1/0) 0.169 0.375 0.000 2630 0.284 0.451 0.000 1430 −0115***
Number of Connections 0.398 1.414 0.000 2630 0.856 4.235 0.000 1430 −0.458***
Number of Connections
if Connection=1
2.351 2.692 1.000 445 3.015 7.534 2.000 406 −0.664*
This table reports descriptive statistics on personal connections reported in BoardEx for all customer-supplier
pairs and customer-nonsupplier vendor pairs (N = 4060) partitioned by whether a vendor is a supplier. For
each connection variable (CON_EDU, CON_WORK, and CONNECTED), we report statistics on the percent-
age of pairs in the partition that have a personal connection, the average number of connections in the partition,
and the average number of connections when at least one connection exists. Diff is the difference between the
two partitions. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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where SUPPLIERi,j,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a vendor j is also a
supplier of customer i at year t and 0 otherwise. The subscripts i, j, and t index for customer
i, vendor j, and fiscal year t. The main variable of interest is CONNECTEDi,j,t. It takes the
value of 1 if at least one educational or work-based connection between the customer’s (i’s)
executives and the vendor’s (j’s) executives exists and 0 otherwise. We use a dichotomous
coding for personal connections throughout the empirical analyses, because it provides the
most intuitive interpretation of the results. For robustness, we also report the baseline results
for educational (CON_EDUi,j,t) and past-work connections (CON_WORKi,j,t), measured
separately, and for the number of connections (measured as the natural logarithm of one
plus the number of connections between a vendor and a customer).
DISTANCEi,j,t is the natural logarithm of the distance in miles between the zip code
of the customer headquarters and that of the vendor headquarters. We include this
variable because distance is likely to relate to delivery time and costs (Winter 1988;
Sarkis and Talluri 2002). A longer distance between the two firms is also likely to be
associated with a larger information gap between the customer and the vendor.
We control for a large set of vendor characteristics (VEND_CONTROLSl,j,t) identi-
fied in the supply-chain literature to alleviate the correlated omitted-variable concern.
The control variables in our model are based on the supplier-selection literature that
identifies prominent factors that customers consider when evaluating vendors in sup-
plier selection. These factors are as follows: (1) product quality and reputation in the
product market (Liu et al. 2000; Weber et al. 2000; Demirtas and Üstün 2009), which
we control for using age, sales, and dominance in its product market; (2) delivery
reliability/on-time delivery (Liu et al. 2000; Weber et al. 2000; Demirtas and Üstün
2009), which we control for by the distance between the customer and vendor; (3)
product price/competitiveness of cost (Liu et al. 2000; Weber et al. 2000; Demirtas and
Üstün 2009), which we control for by gross margin and operating margin; (4)
manufacturing capability (Liu et al. 2000; Sevkli et al. 2007; Demirtas and Üstün
2009), which we control for by capital expenditure and asset tangibility; (5) manage-
ment (Chen and Huang 2007; Sevkli et al. 2007), which we control for by the ratio of
executives graduating from top universities; (6) manufacturing technology/technical
capability (Liu and Hai 2005; Chen and Huang 2007; Sevkli et al. 2007), which we
control for by the ratio of executives with doctorates and master’s degrees; (7) research
and development (Sevkli et al. 2007; Demirtas and Üstün 2009), which we control for
by R&D intensity; (8) financial strength/risk (Muralidharan et al. 2002; Liu and Hai
2005; Chen and Huang 2007), which we control for by cash holdings, leverage, return
on assets, sales growth, and negative cash flow; and (9) production flexibility/flexibility
of the response to customer requests (Muralidharan et al. 2002; Sarkis and Talluri 2002;
Demirtas and Üstün 2009), which we control for by inventory holding period, PP&E
turnover, days of accounts receivable, days of accounts payable, and days of inventory.
We include customer-year fixed effects and thus do not include customer-specific
controls. Appendix Table 10 provides a detailed definition of all variables used. We
follow Bauer et al. (2018), where applicable, in measuring control variables.
Ai and Norton (2003) note that nonlinear fixed-effects models generate biased
estimates for interaction terms. To mitigate these biases and enable a more intuitive
interpretation of the economic magnitude of the coefficients, we focus on a linear
probability model using ordinary least squares (OLS) to test the hypothesis. Duchin and
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Sosyura (2014) adopt a similar approach. We verify, however, that the magnitude of the
effect in the OLS regression resembles the one in a probit regression.
Table 4 reports results of the analysis based on the baseline supplier-selection
sample (N = 4060), which includes customer-supplier and customer-nonsupplier ven-
dor pairs identified using the Mahalanobis-distance approach. We vary the measure-
ment of personal connections across columns. In columns 1 and 2, personal connec-
tions are measured as an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the existence of
personal connections and 0 otherwise. In columns 3 and 4, they are measured as the
natural logarithm of one plus the number of connections. In columns 1 and 3, the
personal-connections measure captures both work-based connections and educational
connections (CONNECTED), and, in columns 2 and 4, each type of personal connec-
tion is measured individually (CON_WORK and CON_EDU). The coefficients on
connection variables, CONNECTED, CON_EDU, and CON_WORK, are positive and
significant at the 5% level or better across all specifications. Results in column 1—
coefficient on CONNECTED of 0.217—suggest the existence of a personal connection
increases the likelihood of being selected as a supplier by 21%, representing a 60%
increase over the baseline probability (35%). Results in column 2 suggest the effect of
past-work connections is larger than that of educational connections (0.221 versus
0.125). The coefficient on DISTANCE is significantly negative as predicted. The
coefficients on other control variables are largely insignificant, which may stem from
the fact that nonsupplier vendors in our sample are, by design, similar to suppliers.
4.2 Endogeneity and sensitivity analyses
Though we include the comprehensive set of control variables described in section 4.1 in the
supplier-selection model, given that this process involves multiple unobservable factors,
endogeneity concerns such as omitted correlated variables need to be further addressed. In
this section, we detail additional analyses we perform to mitigate these concerns.
4.2.1 The effect of management rank and position
The effect of personal connections likely varies with the influence of the connected executive
on supplier selection and her function in the firm. For example, customer COOs that typically
oversee supplier selection in firms are likely to have a stronger influence on the selection
process than any other C-level executive.8 To the extent that endogeneity exists in our
analysis, it is unlikely to vary predictably with the rank and position of the connected
executive. Thus the tests of the effect of personal connections across different levels and
functions of connected executives can help alleviate the endogeneity concern.
Table 5 reports results of such tests based on the supplier-selection sample. Columns
1–3 focus on executive ranks: CEOs in column 1, C-level executives (e.g., CEO, CFO,
and COO) in column 2, and lower-level executives in column 3. To make a fair
comparison across executive levels or functions, we keep in each analysis only
7 This magnitude is quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the marginal effect (18.9%) computed from an
untabulated probit estimation.
8 Web searches yield a few articles that provide anecdotal evidence indicating the COO is the officer
overseeing the supply chain. See, for example, McCann (2014).
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Table 4 Supplier-Selection Regression - The Effect of Personal Connections on Supplier Selection
Connection (YES/NO) Log Number of Connections







DISTANCE −0.019** −0.018*** −0.018** −0.018**
(−2.62) (−2.68) (−2.52) (−2.53)
LARGEST_S 0.021 0.025 0.022 0.024
(0.43) (0.54) (0.47) (0.52)
IVY_LEAGUE_S 0.003 −0.003 −0.002 −0.004
(0.07) (−0.08) (−0.06) (−0.11)
PHD_MASTERS_S −0.048 −0.046 −0.046 −0.045
(−1.16) (−1.13) (−1.10) (−1.08)
SIZE_S 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.64) (0.37) (0.40) (0.35)
AGE_S −0.050*** −0.050*** −0.049*** −0.049***
(−3.15) (−3.09) (−3.07) (−3.06)
ROA_S −0.503 −0.506 −0.509 −0.519
(−1.08) (−1.08) (−1.10) (−1.11)
LEV_S 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.004
(0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06)
TANGIBILITY_S 0.056 0.051 0.047 0.046
(0.47) (0.44) (0.39) (0.38)
CASH_S 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.002
(0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
SALE_GROWTH_S 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.17) (0.21) (0.24) (0.26)
GM_S 0.109*** 0.105** 0.103** 0.102**
(2.66) (2.51) (2.41) (2.36)
PM_S −0.018 −0.012 −0.011 −0.009
(−0.25) (−0.17) (−0.15) (−0.13)
CAPEX_S 0.189 0.199 0.186 0.195
(0.5) (0.53) (0.50) (0.52)
DAYS_INV_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.19) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23)
DAYS_AP_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(−0.16) (−0.20) (−0.17) (−0.19)
DAYS_AR_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(−0.05) (0.00) (−0.06) (−0.04)
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observations in which the specific personal connection in consideration exists. For
example, in column 1, where we focus on CEO-CEO connections, we only include
observations in which either customer CEOs are connected to vendor CEOs or no
connection exists between the customer and vendor firm at all. In other words, we
exclude observations with personal connections through CFOs or COOs and so on.
This sample-selection procedure yields different numbers of observations across col-
umns. The coefficient on CONNECTED is positive and significant for all executive
ranks.9 The magnitude of the coefficient is larger for C-level connections than for non-
C-level connections (0.371 versus 0.243), with the largest effect coming from the
connections between CEOs (0.500). The difference in the coefficient estimates between
the CEO connections and the non-C-level connections is significant at the 1% level
using an F-test. Columns 4–6 focus on customer executives’ function. Column 4
reports results for vendor connections (at any level and position) with the customer’s
CEO; column 5, for vendor connections with the customer’s CFO; and column 6, for
vendor connections with the customer’s COO. The coefficient on CONNECTED is
positive and significant across all executive functions. The magnitude of the coefficient
Table 4 (continued)
Connection (YES/NO)
Log Number of Connections
Log Number of Connections
1 2 3 4
PPE_TO_S 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.52) (1.53) (1.52) (1.52)
IHLDS_S 0.159 0.159 0.146 0.148
(0.94) (0.94) (0.87) (0.87)
NEGFCF_S 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.011
(0.42) (0.41) (0.36) (0.34)
RND_S 0.141 0.131 0.142 0.139
(0.86) (0.80) (0.85) (0.83)
CONSTANT 0.452*** 0.443*** 0.464*** 0.461***
(4.43) (4.33) (4.56) (4.55)
Customer-Year FE Y Y Y Y
N 4060 4060 4060 4060
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
This table reports results of testing the effect of personal connections on supplier selection for all customer-
supplier pairs and customer-nonsupplier vendor pairs (N= 4060). Columns 1–2 (3–4) report results for the
personal-connection variable defined as an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the existence of at
least one personal connection (the natural logarithm of one plus the number of connections) between
executives of the customer/vendor pair and 0 otherwise. In columns 1 and 3, the connection variables are
constructed to take the value of 1 if either educational connection (CON_EDU) or a work-based connection
(CON_WORK) exists. In columns 2 and 4, CON_EDU and CON_WORK are measured separately. Variable
definitions are provided in Appendix Table 10. Customer-year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are
clustered by customer and year. Coefficient estimates are reported in the top row, and t-statistics are reported in
parentheses below. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.
9 Results are similar though weaker if we keep other connections in the regression.
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Table 5 Supplier Selection Regression - The Effect of Personal Connections on the Selection of Suppliers by
Executive Ranks and Functions
CEO-CEO C Level Non-C CUST CUST CUST
Level _CEO _CFO _COO
1 2 3 4 5 6
CONNECTED 0.500*** 0.371*** 0.243*** 0.302*** 0.234** 0.472***
(3.51) (4.02) (4.81) (3.05) (2.52) (3.18)
DISTANCE −0.028** −0.029*** −0.019** −0.028*** −0.030*** −0.029***
(−2.56) (−3.05) (−2.57) (−2.89) (−2.86) (−2.77)
LARGEST_S 0.059 0.047 0.026 0.046 0.043 0.058
(0.73) (0.55) (0.44) (0.65) (0.56) (0.71)
IVY_LEAGUE_S −0.016 −0.016 0.008 −0.011 −0.031 −0.020
(−0.32) (−0.34) (0.21) (−0.22) (−0.64) (−0.39)
PHD_MASTERS_S −0.030 −0.031 −0.040 −0.034 −0.028 −0.025
(−0.65) (−0.73) (−1) (−0.79) (−0.62) (−0.55)
SIZE_S −0.002 −0.001 0.001 −0.004 0.001 −0.002
(−0.17) (−0.06) (0.18) (−0.34) (0.15) (−0.17)
AGE_S −0.044*** −0.045*** −0.051*** −0.047*** −0.043*** −0.045***
(−2.9) (−3.15) (−3.15) (−3.20) (−2.93) (−3.10)
ROA_S −0.931* −0.892* −0.466 −0.856 −0.917 −0.902*
(−1.67) (−1.67) (−0.97) (−1.59) (−1.60) (−1.65)
LEV_S 0.001 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.002 0.019
(0.01) (−0.06) (−0.07) (−0.04) (−0.03) (0.22)
TANGIBILITY_S 0.034 0.052 0.052 0.056 0.038 0.022
(0.22) (0.35) (0.41) (0.41) (0.25) (0.15)
CASH_S −0.023 −0.017 0.013 −0.016 −0.016 −0.029
(−0.2) (−0.15) (0.13) (−0.15) (−0.13) (−0.25)
SALE_GROWTH_S 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.24) (0.18) (0.20) (0.24) (0.20) (0.24)
GM_S 0.105* 0.116** 0.096** 0.109* 0.112* 0.104*
(1.76) (2.03) (2.01) (1.87) (1.95) (1.80)
PM_S 0.033 0.016 −0.011 0.021 0.027 0.036
(0.33) (0.17) (−0.17) (0.24) (0.27) (0.36)
CAPEX_S 0.327 0.353 0.234 0.275 0.322 0.394
(0.82) (0.96) (0.59) (0.72) (0.84) (1.01)
DAYS_INV_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.34) (0.28) (0.21) (0.27) (0.23) (0.38)
DAYS_AP_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.03) (−0.01) (0.03) (−0.10) (−0.02) (−0.03)
DAYS_AR_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(−0.08) (−0.10) (−0.27) (−0.09) (−0.01) (−0.10)
PPE_TO_S 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(2.31) (2.35) (1.25) (2.37) (2.49) (2.27)
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is larger for the COO (0.472) than for the CEO (0.302) or the CFO (0.234), and the
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level using an F-test. Overall, the
results in Table 5 comport with our expectations; that is, the effect of personal
connections on supplier selection varies with executives rank and position.
4.2.2 Executive departure analysis
We identify an exogenous shock to the personal connection—a departure of a con-
nected executive that severs the personal connection between the customer and the
supplier—and test whether it affects the duration of the business relationship going
forward more than a departure of an unconnected executive. Personal connections
between the supply-chain partners facilitate transmission of timely information outside
the formal communication channel, alleviating the customer’s concerns about supply
disruption (e.g., due to the deterioration of suppliers’ financial conditions) and moral
hazard. However, during the course of the business relations, other employees are
likely to develop trust that will reduce the importance of a personal connection in
Table 5 (continued)
CEO-CEO C Level Non-C CUST CUST CUST
Level _CEO _CFO _COO
1 2 3 4 5 6
IHLDS_S 0.205 0.222 0.197 0.23 0.234 0.208
(1.40) (1.45) (1.15) (1.59) (1.42) (1.31)
NEGFCF_S 0.012 0.012 0.020 0.009 0.010 0.015
(0.31) (0.32) (0.58) (0.25) (0.24) (0.38)
RND_S 0.066 0.092 0.116 0.104 0.098 0.078
(0.37) (0.53) (0.69) (0.62) (0.52) (0.44)
CONSTANT 0.537*** 0.528*** 0.466*** 0.548*** 0.525*** 0.544***
(3.94) (4.03) (4.30) (4.50) (4.13) (4.05)
Customer-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 3228 3286 3834 3296 3258 3238
R2 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11
This table reports results of OLS regressions investigating the differential effect of personal connections based
on executive rank and position for all customer-supplier pairs and customer-nonsupplier vendor pairs in the
supplier-selection sample (N=4060). We remove all observations with a personal connection not specified in
the regression title, which causes the number of observations in each regression to vary. The personal-
connection variable (CONNECTED) takes the value of 1 if either an educational connection (CON_EDU) or a
past work-based connection (CON_WORK) exists and 0 otherwise. Column 1 reports results for connections
between CEOs. Column 2 reports results for connections between executives at the C level (e.g., CEO, CFO,
and COO). Column 3 reports results for connections between executives at the non-C level. Column 4 reports
results for connections between customers’ CEOs and vendor executives at all rank levels. Column 5 reports
results for connections between customers’ CFOs and vendor executives at all rank levels. Column 6 reports
results for connections between customers’ COOs and vendor executives at all rank levels. In each specifica-
tion, all other types of connected executives are excluded from the analysis. Variable definitions are provided in
Appendix Table 10. Customer-year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by customer and
year. Coefficient estimates are reported in the top row, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses below. ***,
**, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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mitigating information asymmetries and moral hazards. Thus whether a departure of a
connected executive should affect the longevity of supply-chain relations is not clear.
Ultimately, whether the newly developed trust can fully substitute for the informal
communication channel is an empirical question.
To test the effect of a connected executive departure, we identify all customer-
supplier pairs that have only one C-level executive departing during the period in which
the pair are supply-chain partners. To increase the power of the test and to avoid the
confounding effects of multiple departures, we include pairs with only one C-level
departure. For example, poor performance of the customer may explain both a high
number of customer-executive departures and a termination of a supplier relationship.
A single executive departure is less likely due to poor firm performance. The number of
C-level departures for the full sample is 3996, and 470 of them are in pairs with a single
C-level executive departure. Other data requirements reduce the sample to 308 obser-
vations. The unit of analysis is at the executive-customer-supplier level. We use a COX
proportional hazard model, specified as follows, to examine whether the supply-chain
relationship is shorter following a departure of a connected executive, compared to a
departure of an unconnected executive.
H t;DURATION POSTð Þ ¼ H0 tð Þ*ðβ0 þ β1*CONNECTED EXECi; j;q;t
þβ2*DISTANCEi; j;t þ β3*DURATION PREi; j;t þ β4*CONNECTED FIRMi; j;t
þβl*SUPP CONTROLSl; j;t þ βm*CUST CONTROLSm;i;t þ γt*YEAR FEt þ εi; j;tÞ;
ð2Þ
where DURATION_POST is the time in months starting from executive q’s departure
and ending with the termination of the business relation. This variable is right censored
for cases in which a supply-chain relationship exists at the end of the sample period.
Seventy-eight of the 308 observations are censored. The subscripts i, j, t, l, and m index
for customer i, supplier j, year t, supplier characteristic l, and customer characteristic m.
CONNECTED_EXECi,j,q,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
departing executive, q, is personally connected to an executive at the counterparty
and 0 otherwise. DISTANCEi,j,t is the natural logarithm of the distance in miles between
the zip code of the customer headquarters and that of the supplier headquarters.
DURATION_PREi,j,t is the duration in months of the supply-chain relationship before
the executive departure. We control for the duration before the executive departure,
because it may affect the likelihood of termination. CONNECTED_FIRMi,j,t is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the pair of firms has another personal
connection besides the departing executive, q, and 0 otherwise. We expect an additional
connection to mute the effect of the departure. SUPP_CONTROLSl,j,t is a set of supplier
j’s controls that are largely similar to the supplier-selection analysis. We also include
customer size, age, ROA, and stock returns to control for customer i’s performance.
Table 6, Panel A, reports descriptive statistics for the 308 observations used in the analysis,
partitioned based on whether the departing C-level executive is personally connected. A little
over 5% of the departing executives are personally connected. The average duration of the
customer-supplier relationship prior to the departure of the executive is similar for both
connected and unconnected executive departures (10.5 months versus 13.2 months,
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Table 6 Exogenous Shock - Executive Departure Analysis
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Unconnected execs (292) Connected execs (16) Diff
Mean STD Median Mean STD Median
DURATION (Months) 39.62 18.28 36.00 28.50 8.63 24.00 11.116**
DURATION_POST(Months) 26.39 12.42 23.00 18.00 4.23 17.00 8.387***
DURATION_PRE (Months) 13.23 15.37 9.00 10.50 9.44 8.00 2.729
DISTANCE (LN) 6.41 1.55 6.82 5.33 2.29 5.99 1.076***
SIZE_S 5.43 1.84 5.47 6.70 1.75 6.24 −1.266***
AGE_S 2.35 0.81 2.40 2.52 0.72 2.35 −0.168
ROA_S 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 −0.007
LEV_S 0.23 0.41 0.12 0.29 0.30 0.16 −0.058
TANGIBILITY_S 0.23 0.24 0.13 0.24 0.28 0.08 −0.008
CASH_S 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.026
SALE_GROWTH_S 0.26 0.66 0.12 0.05 0.36 0.10 0.212
GM_S 0.17 1.17 0.39 0.25 0.70 0.34 −0.08
PM_S −0.50 1.89 0.00 −0.26 0.77 0.02 −0.242
CAPEX_S 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.015
DAYS_INV_S 64.90 74.71 38.04 34.00 38.85 22.88 30.898
DAYS_AP_S 74.37 105.33 44.06 52.98 31.05 55.53 21.392
DAYS_AR_S 61.19 44.56 54.80 55.86 17.94 52.25 5.328
PPE_TO_S 12.06 20.52 5.27 18.81 32.60 7.01 −6.751
IHLDS_S 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.041
NEGFCF_S 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.38 0.50 0.00 0.101
RND_S 0.11 0.19 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.01 0.018
SIZE_C 9.45 1.88 9.77 10.14 1.36 10.55 −0.687
AGE_C 3.24 0.78 3.54 3.53 0.58 3.83 −0.285
RET_C 0.08 0.44 0.05 0.08 0.32 0.16 0.005
ROA_C 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.001
MKSH_S 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.01 −0.019
AGE_EXEC 53.95 7.78 54.00 53.81 7.42 52.00 0.136
PROMOTION/
RETIREMENT
0.24 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.45 0.00 −0.007
Panel B: C-level Executives Leaving the Firm: A Turnover Hazard Model, Cox Regression
All Connected Firms Promotion / retirement




DURATION_PRE 1.006 1.009 1.000
(0.71) (0.64) (−0.01)
DISTANCE 1.064* 1.201** 1.320
(1.69) (2.10) (1.13)
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Table 6 (continued)
SIZE_S 1.058 1.098 0.752
(1.16) (0.67) (−1.05)
AGE_S 1.047 0.816 1.422
(0.51) (−0.60) (1.17)
ROA_S 0.037*** 0.025 0.356
(−2.84) (−0.72) (−0.18)
LEV_S 1.121 2.132 0.780
(0.78) (0.68) (−0.32)
TANGIBILITY_S 1.975 0.111 0.035*
(1.20) (−1.35) (−1.70)
CASH_S 1.006 1.146 0.134
(0.01) (0.12) (−0.98)
SALE_GROWTH_S 1.095 0.450** 0.465
(0.81) (−2.15) (−0.90)
GM_S 1.036 0.754 0.712
(0.33) (−1.06) (−0.60)
PM_S 0.943 0.999 1.178
(−0.86) (−0.01) (0.24)
CAPEX_S 0.770 1.983 2269.686
(−0.16) (0.17) (1.21)
DAYS_INV_S 1.000 0.999 0.999
(0.33) (−0.23) (−0.19)
DAYS_AP_S 0.999 1.005** 1.001
(−1.14) (2.16) (0.45)
DAYS_AR_S 0.998 0.997 0.994
(−1.31) (−0.92) (−0.51)
PPE_TO_S 1.006 1.007 0.973
(1.59) (1.00) (−1.22)
IHLDS_S 0.115** 0.004 0.011
(−2.26) (−0.83) (−1.08)
NEGFCF_S 1.100 1.099 1.338
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respectively). However, the post-departure duration exhibits a significant difference—
18 months for the connected executive departure versus 26.4 months for the departure of
an unconnected executive. (The difference is significant at the 1% level.) This comparison
serves as initial evidence that the departure of a personally connected executive increases the
likelihood of the business relationship being severed.
The evidence is further confirmed in Panel B, in which we report results for the
COX hazard model. Based on the hazard ratios reported in column 1, using the sample
of all customer-supplier pairs that experienced one C-Level executive departure after
the initiation of the relations (308 observations), the departure of a connected C-level
Table 6 (continued)
All Connected Firms Promotion / retirement
(0.56) (0.27) (0.34)
RND_S 0.984 0.336 16.661*
(−0.02) (−0.92) (1.65)
MKSH_S 1.058 21.366 126.007
(0.05) (1.52) (1.17)
SIZE_C 1.053 1.435* 1.019
(1.23) (1.82) (0.15)
AGE_C 0.822* 0.358** 0.841
(−1.83) (−2.56) (−0.44)
RET_C 0.835 1.325 0.211***
(−0.94) (0.87) (−2.73)
ROA_C 10.768 3.030 0.000
(0.74) (0.22) (−1.04)
Year FE Y Y Y
N 308 86 75
Pseudo-R2 0.04 0.12 0.12
This table reports results for an analysis testing the effect of a departure of a personally connected executive on
the post-departure length of the customer-supplier relationship compared to a departure of an unconnected
executive. The sample consists of customer-supplier pairs that experienced one executive departure at the C
level over the sample period (N=308). Panel A reports descriptive statistics on the variable of interest and
control variables for the analysis for a sample partitioned by whether the departing C-level executive is
personally connected. Panel B reports the estimation of a Cox proportional hazard model, where h(T) is the
instantaneous risk of a cease of a supply-chain relationship at time T given the supply-chain relationship
survives to time T. All supply-chain relationships that continue to exist at the end of the sample period are
censored. The dependent variable is computed as the number of months between the executive turnover and
the end of the supply-chain relationship (DURATION_POST). The personal-connection variable
(CONNECTED_EXEC) is measured as a binary variable valued at 1 if the executive leaving the firm has
personal connections with executives at the opposite firm along the supply chain and 0 otherwise. Column 1
reports results for full executive departure sample (N=308). Column 2 reports results for the sample restricted
to pairs that have at least one personal connection between them (N=86). Column 3 reports results for an
analysis in which we restrict the sample for executive departures only to promotion (departing executive
moved to a firm of the same or larger size and assumed a similar or a higher role) or to retirement (departing
executive is over 65 years old) (N=75). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix Table 10. Year fixed
effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by customer. Hazard ratios are reported in the first row and
z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels,
respectively.
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executive increases the hazard of terminating the supply-chain relationship 2.64 times,
relative to an unconnected executive departure.
In column 2 of Table 6, we restrict the departure sample to only connected customer-
supplier pairs.We do so to address the concern that a connected supply-chain relationshipmay
differ fundamentally from an unconnected one. This restriction reduces our sample to 86
customer-supplier pairs. Results reported in column 2 convey a similar message—that a
departure of a connected executive precipitates the end of the business relations more often
than a departure of an unconnected executive. In a further effort to verify that the departures
are truly exogenous, that is, unrelated to poor firm performance, we keep in the sample in
column 3 only departures that are likely due to promotion (the departing executivemoved to a
similar sized or larger firm at the same role or was promoted to CEO) or retirement (the
departing executive is older than 65 years). This restriction reduces our sample to 75
customer-supplier pairs. Results are again similar to that in column 1. Taken
together, the results in Table 6 suggest that a loss of personal connections between
supply-chain partners precipitates the termination of their supply-chain relation.
This evidence not only further supports our hypothesis but also alleviates concerns
of endogeneity related to personal connections.
4.3 Do personal connections mitigate information asymmetries in supplier
selection?
To further strengthen our argument that mitigating information asymmetry between potential
trading partners is the channel through which personal connections affect supplier selection,
we conduct cross-sectional analyses that vary the degree of information asymmetry. Specif-
ically, we estimate regression model (1) including an interaction variable between the
personal-connection variable (CONNECTED) and measures of information asymmetry. We
use two measures. The first is the distance between a customer-vendor pair (DISTANCE).
Research finds evidence that proximity to suppliers reduces information asymmetry, because
of lower costs of communicating soft information, monitoring, or both (Noordewier et al.
1990; Cannon and Cannon and Homburg 2001; Hortacsu et al. 2009; Costello 2013). The
second measure is the vendor’s accounting quality (ABN_ACCRUALS_S). Financial infor-
mation represents one important source of hard information. High accounting quality can
mitigate information asymmetry between the firm and outsiders (Wittenberg-Moerman 2008;
Ball et al. 2008; Beatty et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2015). Financial information allows customers
to assess the default risk of a supplier, which is critical to customers’ procurement decisions
(Babich et al. 2007; Beil 2010). As do Aboody et al. (2005), we measure accounting
quality as the abnormal accruals—the absolute value of the residual from the
modified Jones model (Dechow et al.1995). Higher abnormal accruals correspond
to lower accounting quality and thus to higher information asymmetry.
Table 7 reports results that are based on our baseline sample of 4060 observations.
The main effect of information asymmetry is negative and significant for distance and
is negative but not statistically significant for abnormal accruals. Consistent with our
expectation, the interaction between the information-asymmetry proxy and personal
connections is positive and significant for both measures. Economically, a one
standard-deviation increase in distance (1.522) is associated with a 68% increase in
the effect of personal connections (0.025*1.522/0.056). One standard deviation of
abnormal accruals (0.186) translates into a 43% increase in the effect of personal
T. Chen et al.
Table 7 Supplier-Selection Regression – Cross-Sectional Test: Personal Connections Mitigating Information





IA _PROXY −0.026*** −0.130
(−2.73) (−1.52)
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connections (=0.364*0.186/0.158). These results suggest the importance of personal
connections to supplier selection increases with information asymmetry.
4.4 Consequences of personal connections in the supply chain
In the next set of analyses, we investigate the consequences of the existence of personal
connections between the customer and supplier. The motivation for the subsequent tests
is to better depict the effects of personal connections in the supply chain.
4.4.1 The effect of personal connections on provisions in procurement contracts
Contractual terms in procurement contracts, such as product warranties, the customer’s
right to inspect the supplier’s plants, supplier-paid liability or property insurance, and
pre-scheduled periodic meetings between the two parties, are commonly used to address
counterparty risk stemming from adverse selection and moral-hazard problems due to
asymmetric information. Hasija et al. (2008) suggest that, when firms face high levels of
information asymmetry, the contract documents are longer andmore complex to helpmitigate














Customer-Year FE Y Y
N 4060 3637
R2 0.07 0.08
This table reports results of OLS regressions of the relationship between information asymmetry and the effect
of personal connections on the likelihood that a vendor becomes a supplier for all customer-supplier pairs and
customer-nonsupplier vendor pairs. The dependent variable in both regressions is an indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 if the vendor is a supplier and 0 otherwise. The personal-connection variable (CON-
NECTED) takes the value of 1 if either an educational connection (CON_EDU) or a past work-based
connection (CON_WORK) exists and 0 otherwise. IA _PROXY denotes an “information asymmetry proxy.”
In column 1 (N=4060 as in the supplier-selection sample), the natural logarithm of distance between a vendor
and the customer (DISTANCE) serves as the measure of information asymmetry. In column 2 (N=3637 due to
the requirement of data to calculate abnormal accruals), abnormal accruals (ABN_ACCRUALS_S) serves as the
measure of information asymmetry. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix Table 10. Customer-year
fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by customer and year. Coefficient estimates are
reported in the top row, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses below. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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decreases with information asymmetry between customers and suppliers and that covenants
are more restrictive when the cost of monitoring is high. Contractual provisions, however, are
costly to implement, and their enforcement requires effort, time, and, in some cases, payments
to third parties. If personal connections mitigate information asymmetries, we expect cus-
tomers to impose fewer restrictions on connected suppliers. In addition, we predict that
contract duration increases with personal connections (Costello 2013).
We use the 10-K wizard tool and start with a broad search for all material contracts in
the SEC filings during our sample period that have one of the following terms in the title:
“supply contract,” “supply agreement,” “procurement contract,” “procurement agree-
ment,” “service(s) contract,” or “service(s) agreement.” This search yields 6899 hits. We
then merge the file with the BoardEx data file, which reduces the sample to 3135
contracts. For the remaining contracts, we first match counterparty names from the
contracts with BoardEx data. We eliminate contracts that amend an earlier contract.
Firms often redact commercially sensitive information, such as contract duration
(Verrecchia and Weber 2006). We exclude these contracts from the analysis, thus
reducing the sample to 154 unique contracts.We read each of these contracts and extract
data on duration and whether the contract includes particular restrictive provisions.
We investigate the effect of personal connections on provisions in procurement
contracts along three dimensions: overall restrictiveness of the contract to the supplier,
the inclusion of individual restrictive provisions, and the contract duration. For the
overall restrictiveness of the contract, we estimate the following regression model.
RESTRICTIVENESSi; j;t ¼ β0 þ β1*CONNECTEDi; j;t þ β2*DURATIONi; j;t
þ β3*DISTANCEi; j;t þ β4*EXCLUSIVITY i; j;t
þ βl*SUPP CONTROLSl; j;t
þ βm*CUST CONTROLSm;i;t þ δt*YEAR FEt
þ γk*IND FEk þ εi; j;t; ð3Þ
where RESTRICTIVENESSi,j,t is an index of procurement contracts’ restrictiveness. The
subscripts i, j, t, l, and m index for customer i, supplier j, year t, supplier characteristic l,
and customer characteristic m. The variable is computed as the number of provisions in
each contract that impose a cost or penalty on the supplier. The provisions include
product warranty (WARRANTY), supplier-paid liability or property insurance (INSUR-
ANCE), right to inspect the supplier’s production facilities (INSPECTION), pre-
specified meetings between the parties (MEETING), third-party certification of the
deliverables, and third-party performance guarantee.10 The maximum value of the index is
six, and the minimum value is zero. Higher values indicate more restrictive contracts. We
follow Costello (2013) and control for several factors relating to contract design. The first is
duration (DURATIONi,j,t), which we measure as the shortest possible length in years allowed
by the contract. We also control for whether the contract includes an exclusivity term
(EXCLUSIVITYi,j,t), whichmakes seeking alternative suppliers harder, as well as the supplier’s
size, profitability, leverage, asset tangibility, andAltman Z-score (SUPP_CONTROLSl,j,t). For
10 Results are qualitatively similar if we construct the restrictiveness index using only the first four more
commonly used provisions.
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CUST_CONTROLSm,i,t, we include the customer’s size. We include year fixed effects and
supplier industry fixed effects to control for time-trend and time-invariant differences in
acceptable industry contractual terms.11
For contract duration as well as for the individual restrictive provisions, we estimate
the following regression models.
DURATIONi; j;t ¼ β0 þ β1*CONNECTEDi; j;t þ β2*DISTANCEi; j;t
þ β3−6*PROVk;i; j;t þ β7*EXCLUSIVITY i; j;t
þ βl*SUPP CONTROLSl;i;t þ βm*CUST CONTROLSm;i;t
þ δt*YEAR FEt þ γk*IND FEk þ εi; j;t; ð4Þ
Prob PROVk;i; j;t
  ¼ β0 þ β1*CONNECTEDi; j;t þ β2*DISTANCEi; j;t
þ β3*DURATIONi; j;t þ β4−6*OTHER PROVg;i; j;t
þ β7*EXCLUSIVITY i; j;t þ βl*SUPP CONTROLSl;i;t
þ βm*CUST CONTROLSm;i;t þ δt*YEAR FEt
þ γk*IND FEk þ εi; j;t; ð5Þ
where PROVk,i,j,t refers to one of the first four contract provisions (k = 1 to 4) consisting
of product warranty, supplier-paid liability insurance, inspection right, and pre-
scheduled meetings. Following Costello (2013), we include the other three contractual
provisions as control variables when they don’t serve as the dependent variable
(OTHER_PROVg,i,j,t, where g≠k). Because these contract terms are likely jointly
determined and because coming up with multiple exogenous instruments to jointly
estimate all contractual terms is empirically prohibitive, we follow Costello (2013) and
use OLS to estimate the regression in eq. (4) and the four regressions of eq. (5) in a
system of five seemingly unrelated equations.12
Table 8, Panel A, reports descriptive statistics for the sample of 154 procurement
contracts. Overall, 43 (27%) contracts involve connected supply-chain parties, which is
slightly higher than the sample mean of 21% reported in Table 2. On average, a procurement
contract lasts 44 months and includes an average of 2.55 provisions restricting the supplier.
Contracts with personal connections between a customer’s and supplier’s executives are, on
average, longer (48 months versus 42 months) and less restrictive to the supplier (2.35 versus
2.63 restrictive provisions) than those with no connections. Table 8, Panel B, reports
regression results. Column 1 reports results where the dependent variable is the restrictiveness
index, composed of all six provisions. The coefficient on personal connections is negative and
11 We did not include customer fixed effects, because few customers have multiple procurement contracts in
our sample. Out of 154 customers, 120 have a single procurement contract, and 12 have two or more contracts.
12 To address the concern that personal connections may affect both the likelihood of entering the
procurement-contract sample and the contract design, we endogenize the supplier-selection process by using
the Heckman two-step approach. Results are intact and are reported in the online appendix (Table A10).
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significant at the 1% level, consistent with our prediction. From an economic perspective, the
existence of personal connections reduces the restrictiveness by 0.74. This amount is eco-
nomically significant relative to the sample mean of 2.55.
Columns 2–6 report results of a seemingly unrelated system of eqs. (4) and (5).
Columns 2–6 report results for contract duration, requirements of product warranty,
supplier-paid liability insurance, the customer’s right to inspect the supplier’s produc-
tion facilities, and the provision for pre-scheduled meetings, respectively. Estimation
results suggest personal connections increase contract duration by 0.47 of a year, or
almost six months, while decreasing the likelihood of all but supplier-paid insurance
restrictions to be included in the procurement contract. To the extent that contract
restrictiveness increases while contract duration decreases with information
asymmetries of the suppliers (Costello 2013), our findings further corroborate the
results of supplier-selection analyses, suggesting personal connections can mitigate
adverse selection and moral hazard in the supply-chain relationship.
4.4.2 The effect of personal connections on customer operations
To further probe the consequences of doing business with personally connected suppliers, we
examine whether customer-supplier relationships that were likely created via personal connec-
tions affect customer operating efficiency following the formation of the business relationship.
We use four alternative measures of operating efficiency: (1) volatility of inventory
(INV_STD_C), (2) volatility of cost of goods sold (COGS_STD_C), (3) sales efficiency
(SALE_ASSET_C), and (4) return on assets (ROA_C). The first two proxies measure the
efficiency of inventory management, which likely captures supply-chain efficiency directly. If
personal connections mitigate information asymmetry and improve the effectiveness of moni-
toring suppliers, as we document in sections 4.3 and 4.4.1, fewer disruptions of raw-material
supply will occur, implying a lower volatility of inventory after the start of a connected supply-
chain relationship. In addition, fewer disruptions are likely to translate into not only less
fluctuation in product costs but also less inventory hoarding, implying a lower likelihood of
write-downs. This argument predicts the volatility of the cost of goods sold falls after the
commencement of a connected supply-chain relationship. The third and fourth proxies measure
the overall firm efficiency, which may be indirectly affected by the supply chain.
We restrict the sample to actual customer-supplier pairs and run an event study
focusing on the fiscal year in which the supply-chain relationship starts, as follows.
OUTCOME Ci; j;t ¼ β0 þ β1*CONNECTEDi; j;t þ β2*POSTi; j;t
þ β3*CONNECTEDi; j;t*POSTi; j;t þ β4*DISTANCEi; j;t
þ β5*DISTANCEi; j;t*POSTi; j;t þ β6*BTM Ci;t
þ β7*LEV Ci;t þ β8*SIZE Ci;t þ β7*TANGIBILITY Ci;t
þ β9*AGE Ci;t þ β10*GM Ci;t þ γi*CUSTOMER FEi
þ δt*YEAR−INDUSTRY FEt þ εi; j;t ð6Þ
where OUTCOME_Ci,j,t takes on the four operating efficiency measures, alternatively.
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Table 9 The Consequences of Personal Connections in Supply Chain - The Effect on Customer’s Operations
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
N* Mean STD Median
DEPENDENT
INV_STD_C 16,885 0.125 0.126 0.083
COGS_STD_C 18,795 0.075 0.212 0.028
SALE_ASSET_C 18,619 1.104 0.761 0.902
ROA_C 18,796 0.120 0.106 0.126
EXPLANATORY
BTM_C 18,804 0.447 0.757 0.390
LEV_C 18,804 0.238 0.189 0.221
SIZE_C 18,804 8.229 1.811 8.128
TANGIBILITY_C 18,804 0.306 0.240 0.230
AGE_C 18,804 3.028 0.823 3.045
GM_C 18,804 0.366 0.247 0.337
CONNECTED 18,804 0.175 0.380 0.000
* Number of observations before weighting
Panel B: The Association between Personal Connections and Customer Performance after the Formation
of Supply-Chain Relationships
INV_STD_C COGS_STD_C SALE_ASSET_C ROA_C
CONNECTED 0.008 0.009 −0.014 −0.001
(1.60) (1.41) (−1.41) (−0.54)
POST −0.012 −0.002 0.000 0.005
(−1.24) (−0.14) (0.02) (1.05)
DISTANCE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.02) (−0.24) (−0.08) (0.04)
DISTANCE*POST 0.002 0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(1.29) (0.71) (−0.18) (−1.25)
CONNECTED*POST −0.018*** −0.016* 0.025* 0.007*
(−2.65) (−1.88) (1.90) (1.89)
BTM_C 0.002 0.001 −0.026*** −0.005***
(1.05) (0.37) (−6.67) (−5.01)
LEV_C 0.003 0.051*** −0.31*** −0.111***
(0.21) (3.02) (−12.12) (−15.76)
SIZE_C −0.008** 0.006 −0.196*** 0.006***
(−2.02) (1.29) (−26.74) (3.05)
TANGIBILITY_C −0.148*** −0.039 0.212*** 0.024*
(−5.78) (−1.27) (4.53) (1.85)
INV_STD_C COGS_STD_C SALE_ASSET_C ROA_C
AGE_C −0.076*** −0.045*** 0.176*** 0.025***
(−6.49) (−3.36) (8.52) (4.35)
GM_C −0.067*** −0.349*** −0.082*** 0.166***
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The subscripts i, j, and t index for customer i, supplier j, and year t. POST is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for years after the formation of a
supply-chain relationship and 0 otherwise. The variable of interest is the interac-
tion between CONNECTED and POST. We control for factors commonly used in
the literature, such as customers’ book-to-market ratio, leverage, and customer
fixed effects. Following Feng et al. (2015), we add customer tangibility, age, and
gross margin to the regression.
Table 9, Panel A, reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
Each observation in the table represents a customer-year. Our sample spans over
12 years. The number of observations used in the regressions varies, due to data
availability to compute the measures of efficiency. We find 17.5% of firm-year
observations have connections, which is lower than 28.4% for customer-supplier pairs
reported in Table 3. This lower percentage is due to the dilution caused by including
customer firm-years before the formation of a connected supply-chain relationship, in
which case CONNECTED takes the value of 0. Panel B reports regression results. We
use weighted least squares (WLS) to account for large customers (e.g., Walmart),
which have multiple suppliers in the sample. To count each customer once, we weight
each observation by the inverse of the number of suppliers of that customer in the
sample. This way, each supplier is weighted by its relative impact on the customer, and
Table 9 (continued)
(−4.46) (−22.37) (−3.43) (25.79)
CONSTANT 0.429*** 0.355*** 2.339*** −0.014
(5.08) (3.34) (14.45) (−0.33)
Year Industry FE Y Y Y Y
Customer Firm FE Y Y Y Y
N* 5485 6477 6422 6281
Adj. R2 0.56 0.50 0.95 0.79
* Number of observations after weighting
This table reports results of analyses investigating the effect of customer-supplier relationships that were likely
formed with the help of personal connections on customer performance following the start of the supply-chain
relationship. The sample consists of firm-year observations for all customer-supplier pairs in Compustat
between 2000 and 2011, for which we have data on BoardEx (N = 18,804). Panel A reports descriptive
statistics on the variable used in the analysis testing the effect of connected supply-chain relationships on a
customer’s operations. Panel B reports results of WLS regressions testing the association between personal
connections and customer operations after the formation of supply-chain relationships. The dependent variable
measuring customer operation is (1) column 1 – inventory volatility, (2) column 2 – cost of goods sold
volatility, (3) column 3 – sales efficiency, and (4) column 4 – ROA. The personal-connection variable
(CONNECTED) is constructed to take the value of 1 if either an educational connection (CON_EDU) or a
work-based connection (CON_WORK) exists. POST takes the value of 1 if the year falls in the post-supply-
chain-formation period and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix Table 10. Customer
and year-industry fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of
suppliers for a customer in the sample. Coefficient estimates are reported in the top row, and t-statistics are
reported in parentheses below. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.
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we avoid problems of heteroskedasticity. The use of WLS reduces the number of
observations in the regression analyses, compared to the number of observations
reported in the summary statistics of Panel A.
The coefficient on POST is not significant across the specifications, implying firm
operating efficiency does not change after transacting with an unconnected supplier.
The interaction between CONNECTED and POST is, however, negative and significant
for volatility of both inventory and cost of goods sold and positive and significant
for sales efficiency and ROA. These results not only corroborate our main results,
supporting the hypothesis that personal connections can mitigate information
asymmetry in the supply chain but also highlight the real value of personal
connections in improving a firm’s operational efficiency. These results further
suggest the role of personal connections in supplier choice is less likely due to
currying favor, a motive that was found to affect supplier selection in the context
of political connections. The reason is that, under the currying-favor view, we
would have observed lower operating efficiency, following the formation of a
personally connected supply chain.
4.5 Additional analyses, sensitivity tests
We conduct multiple sensitivity analyses, some of which are reported in the manuscript
and others in the online appendix, to provide a high level of confidence in our
interpretation of the empirical evidence. In the online appendix, we report results of
the following additional analyses. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, due to omitted
correlated variables, (1) we use an alternative sample based on propensity-score
matching that matches firms according to the likelihood of connectedness
(Table A2), (2) we use an alternative sample that eliminates the difference in the
distance between supplier-customer pairs and nonsupplier-customer pairs (Table A4),
and (3) we conduct the supplier-selection analysis including various additional fixed
effects (Table A3). Our results are robust to these additional analyses.
To further mitigate reverse-causality concerns, we increase the required time gap
between the start of the personal connection and the start of the business connection
from two years to five years and up to 25 years in increments of five years (Table A5).
To ensure our results are insensitive to the empirical choices we make, we conduct the
supplier-selection analysis based on alternative samples that identify three or four
nonsupplier vendor matches for each supplier, instead of two (Table A6), and alterna-
tive samples that include all four-digit SIC firms of the supplier as nonsupplier vendors
(Table A7), or use 10-K text-based fixed industry classification (Hoberg and Philips
Hoberg and Phillips 2010, Hoberg and Phillips 2016), instead of SIC (Table A8). Our
results are insensitive to these alternative empirical choices.
Finally, we conduct supplier-selection analysis in the cross-section based on the
existence of multiple vendors in close proximity to the customer to further illuminate
the conditions under which personal connections might have a stronger effect. We
show in Table A9 that the effect of personal connections is more pronounced when
information asymmetry between customers and vendors are greater, that is, when there
are few vendors in close proximity, lending further credence to our main findings. We
also use the two-step Heckman procedure to conduct the procurement-contract analysis
to address the sample-selection issue (Table A10).
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5 Conclusion
This study examines the role of personal connections in the selection of
suppliers. We find that a customer is more likely to choose as its supplier a
vendor to whom its executives are personally connected than a vendor without
such connections. The effect of personal connections varies predictably across
management ranks and functions, and the effect is more pronounced when
information asymmetry is greater. These results are robust to multiple tests
aimed at addressing endogeneity in the relation between personal connections
and supplier selection. We also show personal connections are associated with
less restrictive procurement contracts to suppliers and ultimately improve cus-
tomer operating efficiency. Overall, our findings highlight that personal con-
nections may help reduce transaction costs in supplier selection. Our research
also adds to the emerging literature that examines the role of social connections
in addressing information frictions and agency (Sapienza 2004; Engelberg et al.
2012; Duchin and Sosyura 2012). Our evidence in the supply chain setting
comports with personal connections mitigating information frictions. Last, the
COVID-19 crisis has significantly disrupted supply chains. It will be interesting
and important to examine whether personal connections help counteract these
disruptions and fostering a more resilient and robust supply chain network. We
leave these questions for future research.
Before concluding the study, we would like to note a few limitations. First,
our study focuses on supply chain relationships in the public company domain.
Given that private firms are more informationally opaque, it is conceivable that
personal connections might play a different, or even more important role in
addressing information frictions among these firms. Second, as noted earlier,
our findings should be interpreted with caution since we might not have fully
addressed all possible endogenous issues.
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Table 10 Variable Definitions
Supplier-Selection Analyses
SUPPLIER An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for a customer-supplier pair
and 0 for a customer-nonsupplier vendor pair.
CON_EDU An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one educational
connection exists between a vendor’s executives and a customer’s
executives and 0 for no such connections. To be coded as 1, executives of
the vendor and customer must have attended the same university for at
least one overlapping year and received the same degree (e.g., MBA).
This personal connection must have started more than two years before
the start of the customer-supplier relationship.
CON_WORK An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one past work-based
connection exists between a vendor’s executives and a customer’s
executives and 0 for no such connections. To be coded as 1, executives of
the vendor and the customer must have worked at the same organization
for at least one overlapping year before starting employment at the vendor
or at the customer, and this personal connection must have started more
than two years before the start of the customer-supplier relationship.
CONNECTED An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if at least one personal
connection exists between a vendor’s executives and a customer’s
executives and 0 for no such connections. To be coded as 1, executives of
the vendor and the customer must have either an educational connection
(CON_EDUi,j,t) or a past work-based connection (CON_WORKi,j,t) as
defined above.
LARGEST_S An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the vendor is one of the three
largest sellers in a four-digit SIC industry (calculated as Compustat
SALEt/sum(SALEt) in a four-digit SIC industry).
IVY_LEAGUE_S The ratio of a vendor’s executives that hold a degree from an Ivy League
university, Stanford University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
University of Chicago, or California Technology Institute, University to
the total number of the vendor’s executives reported on BoardEx.
PHD_MASTERS_S The ratio of the number of the vendor’s executives that hold a master’s,
doctorate, or medical degree to the total number of the vendor’s
executives reported on BoardEx.
TANGIBILITY_S Net PPE to total assets of a vendor (Compustat PPENTt/ATt).
CASH_S Cash to total assets of a vendor (Compustat CHEt/ATt).
SIZE_S/C The natural logarithm of a vendor’s (a customer’s) total book value of assets
(Compustat ATt).
ROA_S Return on assets of a vendor (Compustat OIBDPt / average ATt,t-1).
LEV_S Leverage of a vendor (Compustat (DLCt+DLTTt)/ATt).
LOG_SALE_S The natural logarithm of a vendor’s total sales (Compustat SALEt).
SALE_GROWTH_S Sales growth (Compustat (REVTt- REVTt-1)/ REVTt).
GM_S/C Gross margin (Compustat (SALEt-COGSt)/SALEt).
PM_S Profit margin (Compustat IBt/ REVTt).
CAPEX_S Capital Expenditure Intensity (Compustat CAPXt/ ATt).
DAYS_INV_S Days Inventory (Compustat 365*INVTt/ COGSt).
DAYS_AP_S Days AP (Compustat 365*APt/ COGSt).
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Table 10 (continued)
DAYS_AR_S Days AR (Compustat 365*RECTt/ REVTt).
PPE_TO_S Property, Plant, and Equipment turnover (Compustat REVTt/ PPENTt).
IHLD_S Inventory holding period (Compustat INVTt/ ATt).
NEGFCF_S Indicator variable equal to 1 if free cash flow (Compustat OANCFt- CAPXt)
is negative and 0 otherwise.
RND_S R&D expense (Compustat XRDt/ ATt).
AGE_S/C The natural log of number of years the supplier (customer) is listed in
Compustat.
DISTANCE The natural logarithm of the distance in miles between the customer’s
headquarters and the vendor’s headquarters.
ABN_ACCRUALS_S Vendor’s absolute value of lagged abnormal accruals using the Dechow et
al. (1995) modified Jones model. Specifically, for each year, we run an
industry-specific regression (using Fama-French 48-industry classification):
TAi;t
Asseti;t−1
¼ k1;t 1Asseti;t−1 þ k2;t
ΔREVi;t
Asseti;t
þ k3;t PPEi;tAsseti;t−1 þ ei;t ;
where TA is total accruals (difference between earnings before income tax
and cash flow from operations – Compustat (IBt-OANCFt)),ΔREV is the
change in revenues (Compustat SALEt-SALEt-1), and PPE is the gross
value of property, plant, and equipment (Compustat PPEGTt). The
coefficient estimates from the above equation are used to estimate the
firm-specific normal total accruals (NTA ) for the sample firms:




where ΔAR is the change in accounts receivable (Compustat RECCHt). We
use the absolute value of the difference between total accruals and normal
total accruals for each firm as our measure of abnormal accruals
(ABN_ACCRUALS_St=|(TAt/Assetst-1–NTAt)|).
Executive Departure Analysis
DURATION The time in months from origination of the contract until the termination of a
customer-supplier relationship.
DURATION_POST The time in months from an executive’s departure until the termination of a
customer-supplier relationship.
DURATION_PRE The time in months from origination of the contract to an executive’s
departure.
CONNECTED_EXEC An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the executive leaving the
firm has personal connections with executives at the opposite firm along the
supply chain and 0 otherwise.
CONNECTED_FIRM An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the pair of firms has another
personal connection besides the departing executive and 0 otherwise.
MKSH_S Supplier’s share of the four-digit SIC code revenue in the year the executive
departs.
AGE_EXEC Executive’s age when departing the company.
PROMOTION/RETIREMENT An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the executive departing is 65
years or older or if his or her next position is of the same rank or higher and
the company is at least of the same size as the company he or she left.
Procurement-Contracts Analysis
RESTRICTIVENESS The number of restrictive provisions on the supplier included in a
procurement contract. The maximum number of provisions is six and
includes product warranty, supplier-paid liability/property insurance, the
customer’s right to inspect supplier production facilities, pre-scheduled
periodic meetings between the customer’s and supplier’s representatives,
third-party certification, and third-party performance guarantee.
DURATION The shortest contract term in years allowed by the procurement contract.
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Table 10 (continued)
WARRANTY An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the procurement contract
includes a product warranty provision and 0 otherwise.
INSURANCE An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the procurement contract
includes a supplier-paid liability/property insurance provision and 0
otherwise.
INSPECTION An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the procurement contract
includes a customer’s right to inspect the supplier’s production facilities and
0 otherwise.
MEETING An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the procurement contract
includes a provision on pre-scheduled periodic meetings between the
customer’s and supplier’s representatives and 0 otherwise.
EXCLUSIVITY An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for procurement contracts that
specify exclusivity of the customer/supplier and 0 otherwise.




POST An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all years after the initiation
of customer-supplier relationship and 0 otherwise.
INV_STD_C The standard deviation of the customer’s quarterly inventory to assets
divided by the mean level (Compustat stdevq=1-4(INVTQq/ATQq)/
averageq=1-4(INVTQq/ATQq)).
COGS_STD_C The standard deviation of the customer’s quarterly cost of goods sold to
assets divided by the mean level (Compustat stdevq=1-4(COGSQq/SALEQq)/
averageq=1-4(COGSQq/SALEQq)).
ROA_C Return on assets of the customer (Compustat OIBDPt / average ATt,t-1).
SALE_ASSET_C The ratio of sales to assets at the customer (Compustat SALEt / average
ATt,t-1).
BTM_C Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity of the customer
(Compustat SEQt/MKVALTt).
LEV_C Leverage of a customer (Compustat (DLCt+DLTTt)/ATt).
TANGIBILITY_C Net PPE to total assets of a customer (Compustat PPENTt/ATt).
All variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. All ratios are bounded by -1 and 1
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